• ANU Africa Network

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    This website was established in 2013 by David Lucas, and renovated and relaunched in 2020 as part of a project to increase awareness of Africa and African studies in the ANU and the ACT, funded by the Australian Government’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

    Another outcome of that project was a major research report, published in August 2021, African Studies at the Australian National University and in the Australian Capital Territory, analyzing the past, present and future of the study of Africa at the Australian National University and the wider Australian University sector.

    The major innovation on this updated website is the creation of the ACT Africa Expert Directory which lists experts on Africa from institutions around the ACT, primarily the ANU. We will continue to curate this list, offering a key resource for media, government and non-government organizations seeking expert facts and opinions on Africa. Individuals can request to be added to the list by contacting the website managers.

    Another notable addition is the expanded directory of PhD theses on Africa produced in the territory’s universities, a solid measure of the vitality of the study of Africa in the city of Canberra.

    Reviewing these directories, it is revealing to note that the vast majority of research on Africa is produced by disciplinary experts (environmental scientists, economists, demographers, etc.) rather than area studies experts. This means that the study of Africa is woven into the fabric of the research culture of the ANU and the ACT’s other universities in ways that are not necessarily apparent.


  • Removing bias from recommendation algorithms can lead to a fairer, more transparent, immigration system

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    By Bernard Baffour

    This article was originally published by the ABC.

    Immigration decisions are increasingly being outsourced in order to save costs and optimise resources. It is often efficient to rely on algorithms that analyse historical data and identify patterns to indicate potential risks or outcomes. In most government departments, resources such as time, staff, and finances are limited, and these algorithms can provide insights into where resources are most needed for efficiency planning.

    In most cases, these algorithms can provide enhanced decision-making by distilling the complex and uncertain factors, and making data-driven recommendations. Human decision makers can then supplement their expertise and intuition based on these algorithmic recommendations.

    The use of algorithms in this way and for these purposes raises some significant problems, however. Let me highlight them through the following scenarios.

    How algorithms can reproduce bias

    Officials are often faced with the difficult decision of screening for children at risk of child maltreatment. Most models usually include race (of child or parent) in their range of relevant factors. But although race is highly predictive, it can reflect inherent biases and prejudices. In this example, a predictive model which did not use race was found to be better, because the model which included race screened in low-risk black children and screened out high-risk white children.

    In other words, this model made fewer false positive decisions (flagging children as “at-risk” in predominantly “black” families when the children were actually “non-risk”) and fewer false negative decisions (flagging “at-risk” children as “non-risk” in largely “white” families).

    In the second example, it is well known that Australia’s Indigenous population has significantly lower levels of education, income, employment, and health and wellbeing, such that the proportion of Indigenous people in an area is highly correlated with socio-economic disadvantage. While this is a “statistically significant” variable, its use “problematises” Indigeneity.

    Hence, in research I conducted with Sumonkanti Das, Mu Li and Alice Richardson, using geographic remoteness instead of the proportion of Indigenous people in an area was found to be most effective. This has the advantage of capturing the relative isolation of local communities both for Indigenous areas and rural neighbourhoods.

    Applying a debiased predictive model to visa applications

    The Department of Home Affairs deals with thousands of visa applications on a daily basis, and predictive analysis is extremely valuable in providing quick and efficient decisions. In most cases, “country of birth” or “nationality” is highly correlated with whether a person will violate their visa conditions. But this can be liable to prejudices and institutionalised racism. As a matter of fact, the country with most visa applicants who fail to comply with their visa conditions is the United Kingdom. This is not to say that British people per se are more likely to overstay their visas — it is, rather, back-packers and young people on working holiday visas who are the likeliest offenders.

    In a fairer system, if two medical doctors of equal standing were both accepted to a conference in Sydney, then granting the visa should not depend on whether they possess a passport from Switzerland or Peru, from Germany or Ghana.

    A few months ago, I wrote about the experience of my sister, who is an anaesthesiologist at the Korle-Bu Teaching Hospital in Accra, Ghana. She was repeatedly denied a visa to come to Australia for a brief visit to visit me and my family in Canberra, on the grounds that she “had not provided sufficient evidence that [she] genuinely intended to stay temporarily in Australia”. The entire decision-making process was conjectural, arbitrary, and highly prejudicial. Since that article was published, many people have reached out to me, expressing similar concerns, sharing similar experiences, and thanking me for articulating what had happened to them, but lamenting the fact that they felt they didn’t have the agency to do what I did.

    This experience is not limited to applicants from sub-Saharan, South Asian, and South American countries, however. The same thing has happened to people from a number of European countries. While I believe that secure borders are important for ensuring our safety and managing immigration, there needs to be some transparency and objectivity in the way the visa application process works. The biggest complaint people have is the unaccountable and seemingly “God-like” powers visa officials possess.

    Removing the country of birth (or nationality) from the algorithm, and using instead observable background characteristics — such as occupation/education or labour force participation of the applicant or sponsor — will arguably be less influenced by prejudices and biases.

    Indeed, well-established sponsors who are in good employment and in good standing in the community are unlikely to want to break the law by encouraging or condoning their sponsored family members or friends to break the law and flout their visa obligations. Furthermore, applicants sponsored by well-established sponsors pose less of a risk to flouting their visa obligations since their sponsors can easily be contacted or traced in the unlikely event that their sponsored family members do not meet their visa obligations.

    Well-established sponsors who are in good employment and in good standing in the community are also unlikely to let their sponsored family members break the law because it will adversely affect their chances of sponsoring any more family members or friends in the future.

    Transparency and fairness matter — ethically and electorally

    Prejudicial treatment of visa applications could loom as a significant issue in future federal elections — people from the Global South comprise around 18.5 per cent of the electorate. In fact, this is almost certainly an underestimate, because it does not account for migrants with Australian citizenship. With more than half of the Australian population born overseas, or with a parent born overseas, it is easy to imagine how the manifest unfairness in the treatment of such a large portion of the of the population could have serious electoral ramifications.

    Nor should this be seen as a problem remote from “ordinary Australians”. After all, the very idea that some citizens are subjected to a different set of rules, and thus are denied the fair treatment extended to others, could hardly be more un-Australian.

    Bernard Baffour is an Associate Professor in the School of Demography and the Associate Dean of Inclusivity, Diversity, Equity and Access (IDEA) at the College of Arts and Social Sciences at the Australian National University.


  • Call for Abstracts: 3rd Annual Australian National University African Studies Network Conference

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    Theme: Decolonising Knowledge: Reframing Australia-Africa Relations in the New Era
    Dates: November 28-29, 2024
    Location: Australian National University (ANU) Campus, Canberra (Virtual participation available)

    The Australian National University African Studies Network is pleased to announce the call for abstracts for its 3rd Annual Conference. We invite submissions from all disciplines related to the conference theme. The conference aims to explore the evolving dynamics of Australia-Africa relations, with a focus on decolonising knowledge and reshaping intellectual exchanges.


    Submission Guidelines

    • Abstract Length: Maximum 250 words
    • Bio and Institutional Affiliation: Maximum 100 words
    • Submission Deadline: October 30, 2024, by 11:59 AEST
    • Email: africanstudiesnetwork@anu.edu.au with your name, followed by “ASN 2024” and complete the short online registration form.

    Eligibility and selection criteria
    We welcome submissions from students, senior academics, policymakers, corporates, and civil society leaders. Abstracts will be considered on a rolling basis. Presenters can choose to participate either virtually or in person.

    For any questions, please contact us at africanstudiesnetwork@anu.edu.au.

    We extend our gratitude to the Student Extracurricular Enrichment Fund (SEEF) at ANU and the ANU Research School of Social Sciences (RSS) for their support. More information can be found in the attached flyer. Please share this call with your networks.

    Contextual Background

    Australia-Africa relations are evolving, with recent years seeing a shift toward ‘new engagement’ or ‘re-engagement’ with the continent (Mickler & Lyons, 2013). The Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) notes that Australia engages with all 54 African UN member states in politics, trade, investment, development cooperation, peace, and security (DFAT, 2024). Australia also maintains warm relationships with African regional blocs, including the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

     In trade and investment, DFAT reported AU$9 billion in total trade between the two continents in 2020. Over 170 Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) listed companies operate in about 35 African countries, with PwC (2024) reporting more than 200 companies. Despite recent aid cuts, the Australian government allocated AU$148.2 million to Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa for the 2022-23 fiscal year. However, Australia’s overall aid generosity has declined, with its ranking dropping from 14th to 26th among the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries from 2015 to 2023 (Development Policy Centre, 2024).

    The 2020 census recorded over 400,000 people of African origin living in Australia (Abur, 2020). Australian Defence Force personnel currently serve in the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and assist the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, Egypt. Historically, Australian personnel have participated in UN missions across various African countries.

    Despite these advances, the decolonisation of knowledge in Australia-Africa relations remains incomplete, as argued by Davis & Blackwell (2023) and other scholars. Reassessing how knowledge is produced, valued, and shared is essential. Decolonial approaches are crucial in the new era of Australia-Africa relations, reshaping intellectual exchanges, research collaborations, and educational partnerships.

    We look forward to your contributions and wish you the best in your application!

    References

    Abur, W. (2022). Migration and Settlement of African People in Australia. In I. Muenstermann (Ed.), Human Migration in the Last Three Centuries (1st ed.). IntechOpen. https://doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.107083

    Davis, A. E., & Blackwell, J. (2023). Decolonising Australia’s International Relations? A Critical Introduction. Australian Journal of Politics and History, 69(3), 405–421. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajph.12947

    Development Policy Centre. (2024). Comparisons. Australian Aid Tracker. https://devpolicy.org/aidtracker/comparisons/

    DFAT (2024) Africa region brief, Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Available at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/africa-middle-east/africa-region-brief#:~:text=Australia’s%20two%2Dway%20goods%20and,Kenya%2C%20Egypt%2C%20and%20Sudan.

    DFAT. (2024). Africa region brief. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/africa-middle-east/africa-region-brief#:~:text=Australia

    Mickler, D., & Lyons, T. (2013). New Engagement. Melbourne Univ. Publishing.

    PwC. (2022, August). Australia Africa Practice. PwC. https://www.pwc.com.au/mining/australia-africa-practice.html


  • African Citizens: Breaking the Corruption Cycle

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    By Dr Ernest Mensah Akuamoah 

    The irony of African politics is that those who promise to eradicate corruption are often the ones distributing money to voters, while those who demand corruption-free leadership are frequently the recipients of such payments. This illustrates the intricate relationship between political rhetoric and practical realities shaping the continent’s political landscape. 

    Corruption represents a significant obstacle to good governance and development across African countries. Transparency International’s (2022) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) indicates that 44 out of 49 African countries scored below the midpoint, with an average of 32 out of 100 in the sub-Saharan region. The CPI uses a scale from 0-100, with the lower and upper bounds respectively corresponding to “highly corrupt” and “highly clean” (i.e., uncorrupt) countries. African leaders frequently vow to tackle corruption in their inaugural speeches, but these promises often turn out to be mere political rhetoric shortly after they assume power, with some leaders even becoming implicated in corrupt practices later on. Ordinary African citizens have persistently complained about the pervasiveness of corruption within their countries, pointing fingers at their governments and key state institutions like the police service—as evidenced by several rounds of Afrobarometer surveys

    Generally speaking, there is a tendency among African citizens to criticise their leaders and institutions as being corrupt while overlooking their own contributions to these issues. However, I argue that the perpetuation of corruption is driven not only by politicians motivated by personal gain but also by citizens who expect financial incentives in return for their electoral support. Empirical studies have confirmed the symbiotic relationship between politicians and rent-seeking voters. Research indicates that voters, particularly those who benefit from rent-seeking practices are reluctant to punish corrupt politicians, especially if these politicians are affiliated to their preferred political party. Other studies suggest that voters assess corrupt politicians differently based on the purposes for which the money is utilised. For example, beneficiaries of vote-buying are less likely to support punishing politicians and “many voters do not object to, and may even prefer, corrupt politicians in a system where a single ‘honest’ official is unlikely to reduce corruption overall.” 

    While voters’ tolerance of corrupt politicians is not peculiar to Africa and other developing democracies, it is exacerbated by weak electoral and party financing laws  in less established democracies. This culture of “transactional politics” poses a significant challenge to democratic integrity and obstructs progress towards establishing accountable governance in Africa. Concepts such as “Monetics,” “Monecracy” or “Monetization of Politics” have taken centre stage in African Political life, reflecting the pervasive influence of financial interests in political processes on the continent. Some scholars have even argued that “without money you are technically knocked out” in African elections. 

    Several studies have highlighted the detrimental effects of election cycles on African economies, specifically emphasising how pre-election expansionary policies by African governments negatively impact economic growthinflation, and human development post-election. Moreover, a recent study across 36 African countries shows that increased government spending during election years is associated with higher corruption perception. Hence, election periods present a paradox: while offering African citizens a chance to exercise their political rights, they also tend to leave African countries economically impoverished due to high government spending and their inability to service debts. The widespread expectation of financial contributions from politicians during elections has normalised corruption to the point where it is perceived as a pragmatic necessity rather than a detrimental force that undermines public confidence and inhibits socioeconomic progress. Indeed, some voters view election periods as “their time to chop.” Nevertheless, the long-term consequences far outweigh the immediate benefits of receiving handouts—and poor people are more affected. African voters must keep this in mind with many elections set to take place across the continent this year. 

    While it’s critical for African citizens to demand accountability and transparency from elected officials, it’s equally essential for the African populace to engage in self-reflection and recognise their own contributions to the issue of corruption. This introspective approach will hopefully promote a greater sense of personal accountability and inspire collective efforts to promote integrity in governance. Additionally, the significance of civil society organisations (CSOs) and the media in advocating for democratic reformscombating corruption, and promoting good governance cannot be overstated. Regrettably, these institutions sometimes fail to fulfill their mandates due to partisanship and biased reporting, underscoring the importance of their neutrality in the fight against corruption. 

    Admittedly, poverty and low development create vulnerabilities that can be exploited by politicians, but this should not prevent African citizens from demanding accountability from their elected officials or excuse their involvement in corrupt practices. Rather, the difficult economic conditions should provide the impetus for African citizens to unite and demand for change. 

    In conclusion, a fundamental change is necessary for tackling corruption on the continent and this will require moving from the current practice of transactional politics to a truly participatory democracy built on principles of integrity, fairness, and social equity. By resisting the incentives of short-term financial gains and demanding ethical conduct from their leaders, African citizens can significantly contribute to creating a future where corruption is less attractive to both the giver and receiver, and where governments prioritise the collective good over privileged interests. 

    Dr Ernest Mensah Akuamoah is a Sessional Academic in the School of Politics and International Relations at The Australian National University. His research interests include electoral violence and African politics. He can be reached via email at Ernest.akuamoah@anu.edu.au 

    This article was originally published in the Australian Institute of International Affairs.